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THE LAW OF BARGAINING
RUSSELL KOROBKIN,* MICHAEL MOFFITT,** & NANCY WELSHt
Negotiation is often compared to poker. This analogy is apt in two related
respects. First, poker players and negotiators both sometimes perceive
opportunities to deceive or exploit their counterparts in ways that produce a
distributive advantage. Indeed, lies, bluffs, false signals, and manipulation
occupy a significant place in the repertoires of some negotiators. Second, the
ability of both negotiators and poker players to deceive and exploit is
constrained by rules governing behavior. This brief essay surveys the ways in
which law constrains such behavior on the part of negotiators.
At least three categories of rules comprise the law of bargaining. First,
common law limitations govern virtually all negotiators: the doctrines of fraud
and misrepresentation limit the extent to which negotiators may deceive, and
the doctrine of duress limits the extent to which bargainers can use superior
bargaining power to coerce agreement. Second, context-specific laws
sometimes circumscribe negotiating behavior in specific settings when
general rules are less restrictive. Third, the conduct of certain negotiators is
constrained by professional or organizational regulations inapplicable to the
general public. These categories are discussed in turn. The final section of
this essay reflects on constraints on negotiator behavior in the absence of law.
I. COMMON LAW LIMITS ON BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
When a negotiated agreement results from false statements made during
the bargaining process, the common law of tort and contract sometimes holds
negotiators liable for damages or makes their resulting agreements subject to
rescission. The common law does not, however, amount to a blanket
prohibition of all lying. Instead, the common law principles are subject to the
caveats that false statements must be material, the opposing negotiator must
rely on the false statements, and such reliance must be justified. Whether
reliance is justified depends on the type of statement at issue and the
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statement's specificity. A seller's specific false claim ("this car gets eighty
miles per gallon gas mileage") is actionable, but his more general claim ("this
car gets good gas mileage") is probably not, because the latter statement is
acknowledged as the type of "puffing" or "sales talk" on which no reasonable
buyer would rely.
While it is often said that misrepresentations of fact are actionable but
misrepresentations of opinion are not, this statement is not strictly accurate.
Statements of opinions can be false, either because the speaker does not
actually have the claimed opinion ("I think this Hyundai is the best car built in
the world today") or because the statement implies facts that are untrue ("I
think this Hyundai gets the best gas mileage of any car"). But statements of
opinion are less likely to induce justified reliance than are statements of
specific facts, especially when they are very general, such as a claim that an
item is one of "good quality."
2
Whether reliance on a statement of fact or opinion is justified depends
significantly on the context of the negotiation and whether the speaker has
access to information that the recipient does not. A seller "aggressively"
promoting his product whose stated opinions imply facts that are not true is
less likely to find himself in legal difficulty if the veracity of his claims are
easily investigated by an equally knowledgeable buyer than if his customer is
a consumer unable to evaluate the factual basis of the claims. 3 The case for
liability is stronger still when the negotiator holds himself out as being
particularly knowledgeable about the subject matter that the expressed
opinion concerns.4 Whether a false statement can be insulated from liability
by a subsequent disclaimer depends on the strength and clarity of the
disclaimer, as well as on the nature of the false statement. Again, the standard
is whether the reasonable recipient of the information in total would rely on
the statement at issue when deciding whether to enter into an agreement. 5
It is universally recognized that a negotiator's false statements concerning
how valuable an agreement is to her or the maximum she is willing to give up
or exchange in order to seal an agreement (the negotiator's "reservation
point," or "bottom line") are not actionable, again on the ground that such
false statements are common and no reasonable negotiator would rely upon
2. See Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 42 (7th Cir. 1980) (calling such
statements "'puffing' to be expected in any sales transaction").
3. See, e.g., Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1918).
4. See Pacesetter Homes v. Brodkin, 85 Cal. Rptr. 39, 43 (Ct. App. 1970).
5. See, e.g., In re Trump, 7 F.3d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that repeated warnings of risk
meant that "no reasonable investor could believe anything but that the ... bonds represented a rather
risky, speculative investment," despite other optimistic claims about the financial stability of the
issuer).
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them. So an insurance adjuster who claimed that $900 was "all he could pay"
to settle a claim is not liable for fraud, even if the statement was false.6 The
law is less settled regarding the status of false statements concerning the
existence of outside alternatives for a negotiator. A false claim of an offer
from a third party is relevant because it implies a strong reservation point, so a
negotiator might logically argue that such a claim is no more actionable than a
claim as to the reservation point itself. But courts have occasionally ruled that
false claims of a specific outside offer are actionable, on the ground that they
are material to the negotiation and that the speaker has access to information
that cannot be easily verified by the listener's independent investigation.
7
The most inscrutable area of the law of deception concerns when a
negotiator may be held legally liable for failing to disclose information that
might weaken his bargaining position (rather than affirmatively asserting a
false claim). The traditional laissez-faire rule of caveat emptor eroded in the
twentieth century, with courts placing greater disclosure responsibility on
negotiators. It is clear that any affirmative action taken to conceal a fact,
including the statement of a "half-truth" that implies a false fact, will be
treated as if it were an affirmative false statement. Beyond this point,
however, the law becomes murky. Although the general rule is probably still
that negotiators have no general disclosure obligation, some courts require
bargainers (especially sellers) to disclose known material facts not easily
discovered by the other party.
8
Just as the law places some limits on the use of deceptive behavior to seal
a bargain, so too does it place some limits upon negotiators' ability to use
superior bargaining power to coerce acquiescence with their demands. In
general, negotiators may threaten to withhold their goods and services from
those who will not agree to their terms. Courts can invoke the doctrine of
duress, however, to protect parties who are the victims of a threat that is
"improper" and have "no reasonable alternative" but to acquiesce to the other
party's demand, 9 such as when one party procures an agreement through the
threat of violence,10 or through the threat to breach a prior agreement after
6. Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1988).
7. See, e.g., Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 1952) (falsely
claiming a "bona fide offer from one Melvin Levine ... of $10,000 per year"); Beavers v.
Lamplighters Realty, 556 P.2d 1328 (Okla. 1976) (falsely claiming a prospective buyer was willing
to pay the asking price for a house and would be delivering a check that same day).
8. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974) (sellers must disclose known
insect infestation of house).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1982).
10. See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d II (N.J. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 176(1)(a) (1981).
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using the relationship created by that agreement to place the victim in a
position in which breach would cause noncompensable damage." Judicial
intervention is most likely when the bargaining parties' relationship was not
arms-length. For example, the common law provides the defense of undue
influence to negotiators who can show that they were dependent upon and
thus vulnerable to the other, dominant negotiator. 1
II. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC REGULATION OF NEGOTIATORS' BEHAVIOR
Beyond the general common law constraints on negotiators' behavior, the
law imposes particularized parameters on bargainers engaged in negotiations
in some specific contexts. For example, labor law places a number of
procedural restrictions on negotiating behavior. Compared with their
counterparts in non-unionized settings, employers, employees, and their
representatives involved in collective bargaining all have considerable limits
on their ability to adopt certain approaches to negotiating the terms and
conditions of employment.
While federal and state laws proscribe a range of behaviors in collective
bargaining contexts, the most vivid encapsulation of these requirements is the
duty imposed on both sides by the National Labor Relations Act to bargain in
"good faith."' 3  The concept of "good faith" bargaining lacks clear
parameters, but a "totality of conduct" standard 4 has given way to a list of
proscribed behaviors, such as disengaging from the negotiations and
presenting take-it-or-leave-it offers.'
5
In other contexts, the law imposes affirmative duties of disclosure rather
than attempting to define the parameters of negotiation behavior. For
example, in residential real estate transactions in many states, sellers have a
legal obligation to disclose a range of information even if the buyer does not
request it.' 6 Supplanting the baseline principle of caveat emptor, many states
have judged that real estate transactions require different foundational
principles.
Finally, in certain bargaining contexts that seem unusually prone to
exploitation, the law provides paternalistic protection for potential victims.
For example, certain legal disputes involving seamen on the high seas and
11. See, e.g., Austin Instruments, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1979).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2003).
14. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
15. Compare NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), with Logemann Bros., 298
NLRB 1018 (1990).
16. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 709.02 (2001-2002).
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their employers require judicial approval, because of the perceived power
imbalance between seamen and ship owners.17 Similarly, most jurisdictions
require court ratification of divorce agreements.18 To protect principal parties
with little ability to monitor their agents, settlements of class action' 9 and
shareholder derivative suits 2° also require a judicial finding of fairness.
Rather than judicial oversight, many jurisdictions give consumers in certain
vulnerable contexts the self-help remedy of unilaterally rescinding an
agreement within several days of acceptance, such as when they accept a
bargain proposed by telemarketers or door-to-door salespersons. 21 Finally, the
law sometimes establishes alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for
contexts frequently characterized by dissatisfaction with negotiated
agreements. For example, lemon laws anticipate that some percentage of
negotiations over used car purchases will result in unhappy consumers. In
states with lemon laws, consumers who are dissatisfied with their purchase
need not establish one of the traditional bases for rescinding a contract or
ceasing performance (for example fraud, duress, or material breach). Instead,
consumers have a streamlined system for demonstrating eligibility for the
laws' protections after the fact.
22
III. PROFESSIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON BARGAINING
BEHAVIOR
Some negotiators operate not only within the legal constraints applicable
to the general public, but also within the parameters of professional or
organizational codes of conduct. These parameters can provide another layer
of substantive constraints on negotiating behavior (in addition to those
provided by generally applicable law), additional or enhanced enforcement
mechanisms, or both.
As an example, attorneys are subject not only to generally applicable legal
constraints on negotiating behavior but also to the administrative regulations
of their state bar associations, which generally reflect the American Bar
17. See Castillo v. Spiliada Mar. Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[S]eamen have
enjoyed a special status in our judicial system [because] they occupy a unique position. A seaman
isolated on a ship on the high seas is often vulnerable to the exploitation of his employer.").
18. See, e.g., Drawdy v. Drawdy, 268 S.E.2d 30 (S.C. 1980) ("[I]t is incumbent on the family
court... to satisfy itself that the agreement is a fair contractual end of the parties' marital claims.").
19. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank, 834 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1987).
20. See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 48lp (2001) (option to cancel telemarketer-induced sales); 16
C.F.R. § 429.1 (2003) (cooling-offperiod for door-to-door sales).
22. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.315-.375 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.71-.78
(Anderson 2001).
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Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rule 4.1(a)
provides that "[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly... make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person., 23 The commentary to the rule suggests that the scope of the rule
roughly parallels the common law. For example, estimates of "price or value"
are not considered material,24 thus permitting lawyers in general to "puff' as
well as lie outright about their reservation prices. One important difference,
however, between the administrative law governing lawyer-negotiators and
the common law governing all bargainers is the absence of the requirements
of reliance and damages in the regulatory context. To sustain a tort or
contract action, the victim must actually suffer harm. Although punishment
for transgressions in bargaining outside of the doors of the courthouse is a
relatively rare occurrence, lawyers can face disciplinary action for making
material misrepresentations even if no legally cognizable damage results.
IV. NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND LAW'S REACH
Not all negotiations take place in a context in which legal structures can
constrain the behavior of negotiators. Some negotiations are conducted in
such a private forum that law serves at most a minimal function. Spouses'
negotiations about the division of household tasks, child rearing philosophies,
and appropriate toilet seat protocols may take place largely beyond the reach
of the law. The law has only minimal impact on other negotiations because of
unlikely enforcement prospects. The black market thrives on the wings of
vibrant negotiation, yet the law provides few behavioral boundaries in those
negotiations. Similarly, the law of nations includes an expectation that parties
will negotiate terms of treaties. No consistent, enforceable legal structure
exists, however, to give force to any constraints on the negotiating behavior of
those states. Finally, in some negotiations, the product of the bargain
precludes any obvious remedies-even in cases when one of the parties
exceeded expected boundaries of behavior. If two businesses deceive each
other in crafting the terms of a joint venture, the law informs how the damage
from their conduct may be remedied. If, however, two legislators deceive
each other in negotiations over the terms of a new piece of legislation, no
obvious bases for legal rescission or damages exist.
In these contexts, the threat of extra-legal penalties (in addition, of course,
to personal ethical commitments) may constrain negotiators' behavior. For
example, in many of the circumstances described above, an aggrieved
negotiator may impose a reputational sanction on the transgressor by
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2004).
24. Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
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revealing the allegedly inappropriate behavior. Many parties will behave
differently in a bargaining session they believe to be entirely private than in
negotiations that take place within the shadow of a threat to disclose.
Although the prospect of publicity is different in structure from legal sanction,
it nevertheless holds some promise of altering the negotiating behavior of
those who are beyond the reach of the formal law of bargaining.
* * *
